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Stop the Bleeding:
Title IX and the Disappearance of
Men's Collegiate Athletic Teams
ABSTRACT
Title IX, originally conceived to protect women from gender
discrimination, has had the unfortunate and unintended effect of
significantly reducing opportunities for male athletes to compete in
their sports at the collegiate level. The various Department of
Education opinion letters interpreting Title IX and its regulations
provide three routes by which universities can comply with Title IX's
requirement of equal opportunities for women to participate in
collegiate athletics, one of which is proportionality between the
percentage of athletic opportunities for women as compared to the
percentage of women in the general population of the school. Circuit
courts' current interpretation of Title IX and its progeny has led schools
to believe that proportionality is the only safe path for avoiding
liability under Title IX, even if it means eliminating men's teams. As a
result, certain men's sports, such as gymnastics, have virtually
disappeared at the collegiate level.
In recent years, male athletes, faced with the elimination of
their sports to achieve Title IX compliance, have brought lawsuits
attempting to reverse this trend. However, these lawsuits have been
universally unsuccessful in the circuit courts, leaving the odds of the
reinstatement of teams or even the maintenance of current teams bleak.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has thus far refused to address this
issue.
This Note begins by examining the text of Title IX, its
implementing regulations, and subsequent opinion letters interpreting
the regulations. It then analyzes circuit court responses to lawsuits by
male athletes challenging Title IX or decisions made in attempt to
comply with it. It also examines a pending Title IX challenge with the
potential to avoid some of the downfalls of prior lawsuits. Finally, the
Note argues that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to address
this issue and conclude that attempting to comply with Title IX by
eliminating or capping the rosters of men's teams is actually a
violation of the statute.
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June 23, 2008, marked the thirty-sixth anniversary of the
passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),1
which prohibits gender discrimination by programs or activities
receiving federal education funding.2 On the same day, the College
Sports Council, an organization dedicated largely to Title IX reform,3
and the Independent Women's Forum, a nonpartisan research and
educational institution,4 began circulating a petition to Congress
calling for "common sense reforms to Title IX enforcement."5  The
petition asserts that reform is needed because "[m]en's collegiate
athletic teams are being eliminated and rosters are being capped at an
alarming rate in order to comply with the 'proportionality'
enforcement prong" of the 1979 Policy Interpretation implementing
Title IX.6 Within six months of its circulation, the petition garnered
more than six thousand signatures.
7
Among the signatories to the petition is 1984 Olympic
gymnastics gold medalist Peter Vidmar.8 Prior to his success at the
1. See Press Release, Coll. Sports Council, CSC Issues National Appeal for "Common-
Sense Reform" of Title IX (June 23, 2008), available at http://collegesportscouncil.org/newsroom/
display-releases.cfm?id=23.
2. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005).
3. College Sports Council, About Us, http://collegesportscouncil.org/about/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).
4. Independent Women's Forum, Our Mission, http://www.iwf.org/about/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).
5. College Sports Council, Electronic Petition: CSC Issues National Appeal for
"Common-Sense Reform" to Title IX, http://www.petitiononline.com/csc2008/petition.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
6. Id.
7. College Sports Council, Electronic Petition: CSC Issues National Appeal for
"Common-Sense Reform" to Title IX, Petition Signatures, http://www.petitiononline.com
mod.perl/signed.cgi?csc2008 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
8. Press Release, Coll. Sports Council, Olympic Greats John Naber, Peter Vidmar, Dan
Gable and Cael Sanderson Join with Actor Billy Baldwin Calling for 'Common Sense' Reform of
Title IX (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://collegesportscouncil.org/newsroom/
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Olympics, Vidmar was a star collegiate gymnast at the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA), which eliminated its men's
gymnastics program in 1994. 9 While the university officially cited
budget concerns as the reason for the elimination of the team, athletes
and observers suspect that the real culprit was the need to comply
with Title IX.10 Indeed, UCLA added a women's soccer program the
same year it decided to drop the men's gymnastics team, lending
support to the theory that the decision was not entirely financially
motivated.1"
Since the passage of Title IX in 1972 and the implementation of
the 1979 Policy Interpretation,1 2 the number of National Collegiate
Athletic Associate (NCAA) men's gymnastics teams has declined
dramatically, from 107 in the early 1980s I3 to just seventeen in 2008-
2009.14 Bob Colarossi, the president of USA Gymnastics from 1998 to
2005,15 has referred to the steady elimination of men's collegiate
gymnastics teams as "one of the unintended consequences of Title
IX."16 Ron Galimore, the current USA Gymnastics vice president of
events, as well as a 1980 Olympian and former collegiate gymnast,1 7
has lamented that "[w]hat we're really focusing on is to stop the
bleeding, keep the programs we have and see if there will be any
review of Title IX."18  Galimore has also stated, "I don't think the
display-releases.cfm?id=24.
9. Frank Litsky, Gymnastics; Colleges Reluctantly Drop Men's Programs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2001, at D2, available at http://www.nytimes.com200l/O8/O7/sports/gymnastics-colleges-
reluctantly-drop-men-s-programs.html.
10. See, e.g., Jen Brown, Gymnast Missed '96 Olympics After UCLA Dropped Team, ABC
NEWS, June 28, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id=885358; Steve Kim, Effects of Title
IX Felt at UCLA, Northridge, DAILY BRUIN, Sept. 22, 1997, available at
http://beta.dailybruin.com/articles/1997/9/22/effects-of-title-ix-felt-at-uc/.
11. Kim, supra note 10.
12. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979), available at http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html [hereinafter A Policy Interpretation].
13. 60 Minutes: The Battle Over Title IX: Male Athletes Suing to Change the Law (CBS
television broadcast June 29, 2003), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/27
/60minutes/main560723.shtml [hereinafter The Battle Over Title JX].
14. NCAA, Current Composition, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID-811 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
15. Helene Elliott, USA Gymnastics Chief to Step Down, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at
D9.
16. Litsky, supra note 9.
17. Press Release, USA Gymnastics, 1980 Olympian Galimore Carries Torch During
2008 Olympic Torch Relay (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.usa-gymnastics.org/
post.php?PostID=2078.
18. Litsky, supra note 9.
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intention of Title IX was to eliminate sports for some and provide
sports for others, but there has been a knee-jerk reaction."19
The apparent link between Title IX and the elimination of
men's collegiate athletic teams is not alleged to be a byproduct of
either the text of the statute or the initial implementing regulation
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), now the Department of Education (DOE).20 Instead, the
provision that is most frequently cited as the driving force behind the
decision to eliminate men's programs is the first prong of the 1979
Policy Interpretation issued by HEW.21 The Policy Interpretation
provides three means of assessing compliance with Title IX and its
implementing regulation, the first of which is "[w]hether
intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective enrollments. .... 22 The move toward compliance with this
provision of the Policy Interpretation means a university must either
add women's programs or drop men's programs until the number of
athletic opportunities for each gender is in accord with the general
population of the school.23 Adding women's programs "often require[s]
a lot of money,"24 which may leave eliminating or capping the rosters
of men's teams as the only viable means for compliance under this
provision. For example, Michigan State University, which has chosen
to comply through proportionality and has dropped men's fencing,
lacrosse, and gymnastics to achieve it, has stated that its athletic
department that is "in the red" and does not have the money to
expand program offerings.
25
The Policy Interpretation also names two other tests for
compliance: a showing of continuing program expansion for the sex
underrepresented in athletic participation, or a showing that the
"interests and abilities" of the underrepresented sex have been
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 291 F. App'x 517, 519 & n.2
(4th Cir. 2008).
21. See, e.g., id. at 519-20; Fresno State Bulldogs, Background Fact Sheet,
http://gobulldogs.cstv.com/genrel/061506aah.html (citing Title IX among the factors that led to
the elimination of the men's wrestling team and explaining that wrestling has a large roster and
no equivalent sport for women, thus impeding the school's attempt to equate women's athletic
participation with the 60/40 female-to-male ratio of the student body).
22. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.
23. Litsky, supra note 9.
24. The Battle Over Title IX, supra note 13.
25. Joe Rexrode, Adding Sports Not Feasible in 'Preservation Mode,' LANSING ST. J., July
14, 2008, at 4C, available at http://www.lansingstatejournal.com/article/20080714/GW/
807140346/0/special.
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"effectively and fully accommodated." 26  While schools could
theoretically attempt to meet one of these two means of compliance,
"[s]chools simply do not view [these means] as viable options."27 As
Allison Kasic, former director of The R. Gaull Silberman Center for
Collegiate Studies at the Independent Women's Forum, explains,
"With so many interest groups out there itching to sue schools over
Title IX, proportionality is the only measure that provides
quantitative proof of compliance." 28 Furthermore, in addition to the
subjective nature of these tests, a showing of continuing "program
expansion" for the underrepresented sex requires the costly addition of
teams.29 As Michigan State's senior associate athletic director put it
in explaining why the university has not complied with Title IX by
adding women's programs, "We're in preservation mode right now, not
expansion mode."
30
In recent years, individual athletes as well as organizations of
athletes, coaches, and fans have brought lawsuits against universities
and the DOE in response to universities' decisions to eliminate
programs. 31 In pursuing the ultimate goal of reinstatement of an
eliminated team, plaintiffs have tried various legal strategies,
including challenging the university's decision as a violation of Title
IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
32
and challenging the 1979 Policy Interpretation and other enforcement
mechanisms as violating Title IX, Equal Protection, and the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).33 These challenges have been
uniformly unsuccessful in the circuits that have addressed them. 3
4
Because it has denied all of the petitions for certiorari arising
out of these cases, the Supreme Court has yet to directly confront this
issue. 35  Most recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
26. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.
27. Allison Kasic, Trends in Title IX, INDEP. WOMEN'S FORUM, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://www.iwf.org/campus/show/19235.html.
28. Id.
29. Rexrode, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 291 F. App'x 517, 520 (4th
Cir. 2008); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. (Kelley 1), No. 93-1327, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14272, at *3 (C.D.
Ill. Aug. 26, 1993).
32. See, e.g., Kelley I, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14272, at *3-*4.
33. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, 291 F. App'x at 520; Coll. Sports Council v. Dep't of
Educ., 357 F. Supp. 2d 311, 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
34. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1), 263
F. Supp. 2d 82, 95 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that no challenges to Title IX have been successful).
35. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches II),
366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1104 (2005), and cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 129
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National Wrestling Coaches Association v. Department of Education,36
a case in which the lower courts found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge Title IX enforcement mechanisms because the
elimination of programs by individual universities is not an injury
redressable by the DOE. 3 In 2008, an organization called Equity in
Athletics, Inc. (EIA) brought a similar lawsuit in the Fourth Circuit,
which had not yet addressed the issue, against both the DOE and
James Madison University (JMU).38 The plaintiffs failed to obtain a
preliminary injunction against the university, which would have
barred it from eliminating seven men's and three women's sports
teams.39 The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari challenging the
denial of the preliminary injunction, which the Supreme Court
denied.40 However, as the petition dealt only with the injunction, it
remains to be seen whether this lawsuit will ultimately be successful
on the merits in the Fourth Circuit 41 or, if not, whether the Supreme
Court will choose to grant certiorari on an appeal on the merits. If the
Supreme Court eventually decides to review this case, it may be the
perfect opportunity for the Court to clarify Title IX and its progeny in
a manner that alleviates Title IX's unintended negative repercussions
on men's collegiate athletic teams.
This Note analyzes the possibility of a legal challenge that
would lead to the reform of the current Title IX enforcement
mechanisms, and thus, reduce the pressure on universities to
eliminate men's programs to ensure compliance. Part I examines the
Title IX statute and the initial regulation implementing it, as well as
the controversial 1979 Policy Interpretation and the subsequent 1996
and 2005 Clarifications. Part II.A analyzes the decisions of several
circuits on challenges to a university's decision to eliminate a men's
sports program in attempt to comply with the proportionality prong of
(2007); Kelley 1, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14272, affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1128 (1995).
36. 128 S. Ct. 129.
37. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches II, 366 F.3d at 933; see also David Burrick, Supreme Court
Refuses to Hear Title IX Dispute, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, June 16, 2005, available at
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2005/06/16/Sports/
Supreme.Court.Refuses.To.Hear.Title.Ix.Dispute-2147913.shtml (indicating that the National
Wrestling Coaches Association will attempt to challenge Title IX in the future by suing
individual institutions, as suggested by the D.C. Circuit).
38. Equity in Athletics, 291 F. App'x at 519.
39. Id.
40. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 129 S. Ct. 1613 (2009).
41. But see Equity in Athletics, 291 F. App'x at 523-24 (citing Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. (Kelley
I), 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994)) (noting that the precedent "raise[s] a serious doubt about
whether EIA will be successful on the merits of its claims against JMU that JMU violated Title
IX or the Constitution in using gender to select which athletic programs to cut").
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the 1979 Policy Interpretation. Part IIB discusses the pending
lawsuit against JMU, which uses a novel approach to challenge Title
IX enforcement. Part II.C argues that the Supreme Court should
resolve this issue by holding that it is impermissible under Title IX for
universities to comply with the 1979 Policy Interpretation by capping
or eliminating teams unless such action would be financially
necessary in the absence of the need to comply with Title IX. Part III
explains how this proposed solution would be consistent with the plain
meaning of Title IX and would permit the majority of the subsequent
clarifications to remain in place.
I. BACKGROUND: TITLE IX AND ITS PROGENY
Title IX, as passed in 1972 and codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681,
provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."42  While the statute
specifically precludes a finding of discrimination based solely on the
percentage of individuals of one sex participating in a particular
activity as compared to the percentage of individuals of that sex in the
general population, the statute does authorize the consideration of
such gender imbalances as a factor in Title IX adjudication.43 Thus,
while a gender disparity in participation in athletic activities as
compared to the proportion of men and women in a particular student
body is not per se evidence of discrimination, it may still be used as
evidence against a university in a hearing or proceeding alleging
noncompliance with Title IX.
44
Title IX contains a provision for administrative agency
enforcement, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 45  This provision
"authorize[s] and direct[s]" each agency providing financial assistance
to education programs to "issu[e] rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability which shall be consistent with the achievement
of the objectives of the statute."46 The provision states that "[t]he
ultimate sanction for noncompliance is termination of federal funds or
denial of future grants."47  The Supreme Court has recognized a
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
43. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1), 263
F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681).
44. See id.
45. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
47. Bell, 456 U.S. at 514-15.
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private right of action to enforce Title IX,48 and these private lawsuits
have contributed significantly to Title IX enforcement. 49
In 1974, Congress passed the Education Amendments of 1974,
which directed the Secretary of HEW (now DOE) to promulgate
regulations to implement Title IX.50 In 1975, HEW, acting pursuant
to its authority under § 1682, issued regulations relating to several
areas of education, including athletics. 51 These regulations (the "1975
Regulations"), 52 which remain in effect today,53 provide that no person
may, on the basis of gender, be excluded from participation in or
otherwise discriminated against in any type of athletic activity offered
by a school. 54 They also set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that
may be considered in determining whether equal athletic
opportunities have been provided, including provision of equipment,
scheduling of games and practices, travel funding, compensation of
coaches, provision of facilities, and publicity.55 Another factor that
may be considered is the effective accommodation of the "interests and
abilities of members of both sexes," 56 which is echoed by prong three of
the 1979 Policy Interpretation.5 7
In 1979, HEW finalized a policy interpretation to "provide
further guidance on what constitutes compliance with the law."58 The
stated purpose of the 1979 Policy Interpretation is to respond to a high
volume of complaints of discrimination and questions from
universities regarding compliance received by HEW following the
passage of the 1975 Regulations. 59 This prompted HEW to further
clarify the 1975 Regulations and to provide a framework for the
resolution of complaints. 60 The Policy Interpretation expands upon
each of the factors identified in the 1975 Regulations, listing
48. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
49. Id. (quoting GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER EQUITY: MEN'S AND WOMEN'S
PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (2000)).
50. Id.
51. Bell, 456 U.S. at 515-16.
52. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 291 F. App'x 517, 519 n.2 (4th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that these regulations were originally codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 and
were recodified in 1979 at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41).
53. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
54. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2007).
55. Id. § 106.41(c).
56. Id.
57. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.
58. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (Dec.
11, 1978)).
59. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 122; 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413.
60. Id. at 71,413.
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numerous indicia of compliance for each. 61 It also creates a "three-
part test" to assess compliance, the third prong of which is considered
to be the most controversial aspect of the Policy Interpretation. 62 The
test states:
Compliance will be assessed in any one of the following ways: (1) Whether
intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or (2)
Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing
practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or (3) Where the members of one sex
are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully
and effectively accommodated by the present program.
6 3
To comply with Title IX, schools need only meet one of the three
prongs of the test.64 However, the first prong, commonly referred to as
the "proportionality prong," is often perceived by schools to be the
"path of least resistance. ' 65 As Allison Kasic points out, the second
and third prongs are subjective and thus leave schools open to
liability.66
In June of 1995, 142 members of Congress wrote to the DOE
expressing concern that schools were complying with the
proportionality prong by eliminating men's teams as opposed to
increasing the number of teams available to women.67 In response,
the DOE issued a proposed letter of clarification and circulated it for
public comment about whether or not the clarification adequately
addressed areas of confusion.68 After receiving comments, the DOE
issued the 1996 Clarification, which "provides specific factors that
guide an analysis of each part of the three-part test. ' 69 While the
DOE acknowledged that it had received significant criticism of the
61. Id. at 71,415-18.
62. For Some Men's Teams It's Title Nein: U.S. Education Department Official Speaks at
Knox College, KNOX COLL., Aug. 15, 2003, http://deptorg.knox.edu/newsarchive/news-events/
2003/x5527.html (quoting Louis Goldstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the United States
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights).
63. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.
64. Rich Haglund, Staring Down the Elephant: College Football and Title IX
Compliance, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 439, 440 (2005), available at http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/
mi qa3994/is_200507/ain14825086.
65. Id. at 441.
66. Kasic, supra note 27.
67. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1), 263
F. Supp. 2d 82, 92 (D.D.C. 2003).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 92-93.
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1979 Policy Interpretation, it declined to make any actual changes,
stating that "it would not be appropriate" to revise it.70
A letter from the DOE accompanying the 1996 Clarification
refers to the proportionality prong as a "safe harbor" for Title IX
compliance. 71 The letter also explicitly states that "[an institution
can choose to eliminate or cap teams as a way of complying with part
one of the three-part test."72 However, the letter goes on to state that
schools are not required to cap or eliminate men's teams to comply
with Title IX.73 It also reminds schools that cutting or capping teams
will not contribute to compliance with prongs two or three of the 1979
Policy Interpretation and further affirms that "each of the three
prongs of the test is an equally sufficient means of complying with
Title IX, and no one prong is favored."74 The letter concludes,
"Ultimately, Title IX provides institutions with flexibility and choice
regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities."75
In 2002, several issues, including the elimination of men's
programs in attempt to comply with Title IX, prompted the Secretary
of Education to form the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics to
study Title IX.76 In response to the study, the DOE issued a "Further
Clarification" of Title IX compliance in July of 2003. 77 While the 2003
Clarification once again declined to alter the three-part test, it does
state that the elimination of teams to comply with Title IX is "a
disfavored practice."
78
In March of 2005, the DOE issued an additional clarification to
provide further guidance to schools attempting to comply through the
third prong of the 1979 Policy Interpretation. 79 A letter sent by the
70, Id. at 92.
71. Letter from Norma V. Cantdi, Assistant Sec'y, Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Educ.
(Jan. 16, 1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html; see also
Haglund, supra note 64, at 440.
72, Letter from Norma V. Cant6, supra note 71; see also Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263
F. Supp. 2d at 93.
73. Letter from Norma V. Cantfi, supra note 71; see also Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263
F. Supp. 2d at 93.
74. Letter from Norma V. CantW, supra note 71; see also Haglund, supra note 64, at 440.
75. Letter from Norma V. Cantd, supra note 71.
76. Erianne A. Weight, The Pursuit of True Legitimacy-Division I-A Title IX
Compliance After the Additional Clarification of Prong Three, 3 SMART J. 42, 42 (2006),
available at http://www.thesmartjournal.com/titleIX.pdf.
77, Letter from Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights
(July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/officeslist/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html.
78. Id.
79. Letter from James F. Manning, Delegated the Auth. of the Assistant Sec'y of Civil
Rights, Office for Civil Rights (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/officesllist/
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DOE as part of this Clarification states that the purpose of the
Clarification is that "some institutions may be uncertain about the
factors" the Office of the Civil Rights (OCR), the branch of the DOE
that enforces Title IX, "considers under part three, and they may
mistakenly believe that part three offers less than a completely safe
harbor."80 The letter further states that, "[i]n essence, each part of the
three-part test is a safe harbor."81
Under the 2005 Clarification, a school will be found to be in
compliance with prong three of the 1979 Policy Interpretation, despite
the underrepresentation of one sex in intercollegiate athletic
opportunities, unless "all three of the following conditions are met: (1)
unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team in the sport(s); (2)
sufficient ability to sustain an intercollegiate team in the sport; and
(3) reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for a team in
the sport(s) within the school's normal competitive region."8 2  The
letter suggests a web-based survey, administered to all current
students or to all students of the underrepresented gender, as a means
of gauging student interest.83 If the survey shows insufficient interest
to support an additional team, it creates a presumption of compliance
with prong three.8 4 By delineating objective standards for compliance
under prong three, the 2005 Clarification has the potential to alleviate
universities' concerns that they may open themselves to liability by
attempting to comply with Title IX through a means other than
proportionality.
8 5
Despite this potential, the 2005 Clarification may have only a
limited impact on reducing the pressure to comply through
proportionality, as illustrated by a survey of athletic directors
conducted in July and August of 2005.86 When asked if they planned
to use the proposed survey as their primary method of Title IX
compliance, 48 percent of athletic directors responded, "no," and an
additional 12 percent responded, "probably not."87  At least two







85. See Kasic, supra note 27.
86. Weight, supra note 76, at 47.
87. Id. at 49.
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up in court.88 Furthermore, the survey showed that there was not
much conversion: many of the athletic directors who said they would
use the proposed survey were already attempting to comply under
prong three. 89 Thus, it seems unlikely that the 2005 Clarification will
significantly reduce the number of schools complying through the
proportionality prong of the 1979 Policy Interpretation.
The impact of the 2005 Clarification on universities' decisions
regarding Title IX compliance may also be significantly tempered by
the negative reaction of the NCAA to the Clarification. 90 The NCAA, a
voluntary unincorporated organization composed of more than a
thousand public and private four-year colleges and universities,91
plays a paramount role in the regulation of collegiate athletics,
including adopting and promulgating standards and regulations and
sponsoring and conducting national tournaments. 92 It is generally
recognized that membership in the NCAA is necessary for the
operation of a "fully-rounded intercollegiate athletic program."93
Thus, the NCAA has significant control over universities participating
in collegiate athletics. In a press release issued immediately following
the Clarification, the NCAA urged its members to ignore the
Clarification. 94 In announcing the NCAA's disapproval of the 2005
Clarification, then-NCAA President Myles Brand criticized the survey
suggested by the Clarification as an inadequate measure of women's
interest in participating in athletics.95  In addition, the NCAA
executive committee adopted a resolution calling on the DOE to
rescind the 2005 Clarification. 96 Due to the crucial role of the NCAA
in collegiate athletics, its refusal to accept the 2005 Clarification will
88. Id. at 50. See also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277. 297-98 (D.
Conn. 2009) (granting a preliminary injunction to female athletes alleging a lack of Title IX
compliance after concluding that the university had not achieved "substantial proportionality,"
lending support to the notion that anything other than proportionality may not insulate schools
from liability under Title IX).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 198 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999).
92. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
93. Bd. of Regents v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
94. Weight, supra note 76, at 44.
95. Press Release, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Statement from NCAA President
Myles Brand Regarding Department of Education Title IX Clarification (Mar. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=5860.
96. Gary T. Brown, Executive Committee Urges Against Title IX Compliance Option,
NCAA NEWS, Mar. 9, 2005, available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=3845.
TITLE IX AND MEN'S COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
likely lessen or nullify the impact of the Clarification on universities'
decisions as to how to comply with Title IX.97
Under courts' current interpretations of Title IX and
subsequent policy clarifications, male athletes have little protection
against universities' decisions to comply with Title IX by eliminating
or capping teams.98 Thus, it seems likely that cuts to men's programs
will continue. In fact, Brand recently said, 'My expectation is that
over the next year or two we are going to see more [cuts of men's
teams] and so I am trying, frankly, to pre-empt the argument against
Title IX... and dissuade universities from going public with this
approach."99
II. CHALLENGES TO TITLE IX BY MALE ATHLETES
Since the passage of Title IX, lawsuits have challenged the
statute, its regulations, and the 1979 Policy Interpretation in almost
every circuit of the United States Courts of Appeals. 100 In earlier
cases, such challenges were raised as defenses by universities in
response to lawsuits brought by female athletes, as the
underrepresented gender, alleging noncompliance with Title IX. 10
More recently, though, these challenges have been raised by male
athletes alleging that the 1979 Policy Interpretation and subsequent
clarifications violate their rights under Title IX, the Constitution, and
the APA. 10 2 Other lawsuits brought by male athletes have challenged
Title IX enforcement mechanisms more indirectly by alleging that
actions taken by universities under the guise of Title IX compliance in
fact amount to impermissible discrimination under Title IX and the
97. See, e.g., Press Release, James Madison Univ., JMU Enacts Proportionality Plan to
Comply with Title IX (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://web.jmu.edu/mediarelPR-
thisRelease.asp?AutoID=846 (citing the need to comply with Title IX as the driving force for the
2006 elimination of men's athletic teams, providing support for the theory that universities will
continue to see proportionality as the only viable means of compliance following the 2005
Clarification).
98. See Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1),
263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 95 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing various failed attempts at challenging either
Title IX and its progeny or the decision of a university to eliminate a team in attempt to comply
with Title IX); see also Weight, supra note 76, at 49 (noting athletic directors' concern that
compliance with Title IX through a means other than proportionality would not stand up in
court).
99. Erik Brady, NCAA's Brand: Don't Fault Title IX for Future Cuts, USA TODAY, Nov.
20, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-11-20-brand-dont-blame-title-
ixn.htm.
100. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95.
101. Id. at 95.
102. Id. at 97.
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Equal Protection Clause. 10 3 These challenges have been categorically
unsuccessful in appellate courts 10 4 and the Supreme Court has thus
far refused to grant certiorari on this issue. 105
As Part II.A will discuss, the lawsuits brought by male athletes
have been unsuccessful for several reasons, including problems with
standing,10 6 deference to a university's allocation of its resources,
10 7
and deference to the DOE's interpretations of Title IX and subsequent
regulations. 08 Part II.B will discuss a pending Title IX lawsuit,
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education, that may
avoid some of these problems by challenging a university's decision to
eliminate programs on the sole stated basis of Title IX compliance.
Part II.C will assert that the Supreme Court should accept this case or
a similar case to resolve this issue.
A. Circuit Court Response to Title IX Challenges by Male Athletes
In 1995, in Kelley v. Board of Trustees, University of Illinois,
the Seventh Circuit rejected a Title IX challenge brought by a group of
male swimmers contesting the decision of the University of Illinois to
eliminate its men's swimming program. 0 9 The plaintiffs alleged that
the university violated Title IX by dropping the men's swimming
program while retaining the women's program. 110  The Seventh
Circuit noted that the decision to terminate the men's team was made
against the backdrop of a $600,000 athletic budget deficit.1 ' The
court stated, "While the University's decision to reduce its athletic
offerings was motivated by budget considerations, other
considerations-including the need to comply with Title IX-
influenced the selection of particular programs to be terminated."
1 1 2
The court also noted that, had the university decided to cut the
women's swimming team as well, it would have been vulnerable to a
finding of a Title IX violation because "[flemale participation would
have continued to be substantially disproportionate to female
enrollment, and women with a demonstrated interest in an
103. Id. at 96.
104. Id. at 94-95.
105. See supra note 35.
106. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
107. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. (Kelley I), 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994).
108. See, e.g., id. at 272.
109. 35 F.3d 265 (1994).
110. Id. at 269-70.
111. Id. at 269.
112. Id.
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intercollegiate athletic activity and demonstrated ability to compete at
the intercollegiate level would be left without an opportunity to
participate in their sport."113 Thus, the court held that, given that the
university's budget constraints required the termination of the men's
program, it was reasonable for the university to choose to maintain its
women's program in order to comply with Title IX and the 1979 Policy
Interpretation. 114
The plaintiffs in Kelley also alleged that the 1979 Policy
Interpretation perverts the Title IX statute, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender.115 However, the court noted
that gender balancing under the proportionality prong is only one
means of compliance with Title IX, and thus, universities are not
technically forced to eliminate men's teams to comply. 116 The court
concluded that, since the 1979 Policy Interpretation was a reasonable
interpretation by the DOE of its own regulation, the court was
required to defer to it.117 The Seventh Circuit also rejected the
plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the 1979 Policy
Interpretation, and thus, affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.118 The plaintiffs subsequently petitioned for
certiorari, but the petition was rejected. 119
In 2002, the Eighth Circuit confronted a similar challenge
under Title IX to a university's decision to eliminate a men's program
in Chalenor v. University of North Dakota.120 The plaintiffs were once
again unsuccessful: the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the University of North Dakota. 121 The
lawsuit challenged the university's decision to eliminate its wrestling
program as unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX, because the
sole reason for the cut was to equalize rates of participation and
resource allocation by sex. 22 Like the University of Illinois in Kelley,
the University of North Dakota contended that the team was
eliminated for budgetary reasons, in this case, the governor's request
for a five percent budget contraction. 23 The plaintiffs countered that
113. Id. at 269-70.
114. Id. at 270.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 271.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 272-73.
119. Kelley v. Bd. ofTrs., 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
120. 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1043.
123. Id. at 1044.
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a private donor had offered to fund the wrestling program, and thus,
the university could have eliminated its funding to comply with
budget constraints without eliminating the program. 124 However, the
court rejected this contention for two reasons: first, the private donor
had not made clear in his affidavit how much he was willing to pay to
fund the program or for how long; and second, in the case of a public
university, funding from private sources essentially becomes public
money and is therefore subject to the constraints of Title IX in its
distribution. 12 The court thus characterized the elimination of the
wrestling team as an attempt "to improve gender balance in the
context of a budgetary contraction."'126 The court further stated, "This
case, like the cases from other circuits and all cases involving
distribution of university funds, involves budget constraints."' 127 Thus,
Chalenor, like Kelley, upheld the university's decision to eliminate a
team to comply with Title IX in the context of evidence of a budget
shortfall that required the elimination of programs.
The Chalenor court, like the Kelley court, also concluded that
the Policy Interpretation was entitled to at least some degree of
deference. 2  The plaintiffs pointed out that documents such as
interpretations in opinion letters are not entitled to "substantial
deference." 129  While the court did not reject this argument, it
nonetheless found that opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' . . . to
the extent that these interpretations have the 'power to persuade." ' 130
The court further found that it was required to give deference to a
reasonable interpretation by an agency of its own regulation in the
case of an ambiguous regulation. 13' Because the court found the
phrases in the 1975 Regulations--"equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes" and "effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of members of both sexes"-to be written at a high level
of abstraction, it determined that controlling deference was due. 32
In 2003, in National Wrestling Coaches Association v.
Department of Education, a group of male wrestlers brought a Title IX
challenge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enjoin the
124. Id. at 1048.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1047-48.
127. Id. at 1048.
128. Id. at 1047.
129. Id. at 1046.
130. Id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1046-47.
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DOE from enforcing Title IX in a manner that leads institutions to cut
or cap the rosters of men's athletic teams.133  The plaintiffs, in
response to the elimination of several university wrestling
programs, 134 challenged the 1979 Policy Interpretation and 1996
Clarification as violations of equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment and the DOE's rulemaking authority under Title IX.135
The odds were against them from the start: the court noted that at
least eight circuits had previously struck down challenges to Title IX
and its subsequent regulations and interpretations on various
grounds. 136 The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that
the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for standing. 137 The court
held that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded causation because
they did not show that the three-part test represented a "substantial
factor" in the decision-making of third parties, the individual
universities.1 3  Further addressing the standing requirement, the
court held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded
redressability because they did not show a sufficient likelihood that
the universities would reinstate the eliminated teams.
139
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the same grounds
but added that, even if the plaintiffs had standing, the availability of a
private action against the universities was an "adequate remedy."140
Thus, it remains unclear how the D.C. Circuit would respond to a
lawsuit challenging the individual institutions directly. In fact, in
affirming the dismissal, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the plaintiffs
pursue their claims in this manner, and the plaintiffs have stated that
they may attempt to do S0.141
B. A Pending Title IX Challenge
In September of 2006, James Madison University (JMU)
announced that it was cutting ten sports teams, seven men's and three
women's, in order to comply with Title IX though the proportionality
133. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches 1, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 85.
134. Id. at 97-98.
135. Id. at 85.
136. Id. at 94-95.
137. Id. at 111.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 112.
140. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wrestling Coaches I1), 366 F.3d
930, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 366 F.3d at 945.
141. Burrick, supra note 37.
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prong of the 1979 Policy Interpretation. 142 The press release stated,
"The proportionality requirements of Title IX mandate that collegiate
athletics programs mirror each school's undergraduate population in
terms of gender. As of the fall semester 2006, JMU's proportions place
it fundamentally out of compliance with federal law."'143 The lack of
compliance resulted from the fact that JMU's student body was 61%
female and 39% male while its participation in athletics was roughly
51% female and 49% male. 144 JMU did not elaborate on why it was
unable to comply with Title IX through the second or third prongs, but
it did state, through the press release, that "[it had] explored every
avenue in search of an alternative to this action ... this plan is our
most viable alternative for reaching compliance with Title IX."' 4
5
Unlike the cases discussed above, the school did not claim that
budgetary constraints caused the cuts and announced that the money
generated by the cuts would be channeled into funding other sports. 146
Following the decision to eliminate the teams, a group of
coaches, athletes, and parents formed Equity in Athletics,
Incorporated (EIA), a not-for-profit organization, to fight the proposed
cuts. 1 47 EIA filed suit against JMU in the Fourth Circuit on March 17,
2007, alleging that the three-prong test of the 1979 Policy
Interpretation was a violation of Title IX, the Constitution, and the
APA. 48 At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Fourth Circuit had yet
to confront a lawsuit challenging the permissibility of the elimination
of teams in order to comply with Title IX.
The plaintiffs first sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
the university from eliminating the teams, which the district court
denied.' 49 As part of its analysis, the court considered, among other
factors, the likelihood of the plaintiffs' succeeding on the merits of
their claim. 150 The court cited numerous sources of authority for the
142. Press Release, James Madison Univ., JMU Enacts Proportionality Plan to Comply





146. Id.; see also Steve Nearman, Title IX Enforcement Hits James Madison Hard, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at C12 (quoting College Sports Council President Jim McCarthy, stating
"track teams have been among the most hurt in college sports. Among the most teams cut....
And the budget is minuscule. It's not budgetary reasons; it's to comply with the proportionality of
the gender quotas"), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/oct/28/20061028-
115416-7089r/.
147. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 291 F. App'x 517, 520 (4th Cir. 2008).
148. Id.
149. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88 (W.D. Va. 2007).
150. Id. at 99.
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general proposition that "[e]very court, in construing the Policy
Interpretation and the text of Title IX, has held that a university may
bring itself into Title IX compliance by increasing athletic
opportunities for the underrepresented gender (women in this case) or
by decreasing athletic opportunities for the overrepresented gender
(men in this case)." 151 However, the court may have overstated the
precedent: several of the cases cited by the court arose as challenges
by a university to the 1979 Policy Interpretation in response to
lawsuits brought by female students alleging noncompliance 152 and
other cases dealt with circumstances in which institutions were
"financially strapped."153  Still, while the court concluded, based on
this authority and in balancing the potential harm against the
potential for success on the merits, that a preliminary injunction was
not justified, 54 the court went out of its way to state that it was
not unsympathetic to the plight of the members of the athletic programs that were
chosen for elimination by JMU's Board of Visitors. These students are innocent victims
of Title IX's benevolent attempt to remedy the effects of past discrimination against
women, and JMU's efforts to comply with Title IX. 1
5 5
In affirming the denial of the preliminary injunction, the
Fourth Circuit similarly concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate the requisite "clear showing of a likelihood of success."'156
The court pointed out that "[c]ourts have consistently rejected EIA's
underlying claim that equal opportunity under [the regulation
implementing Title IX] should be tied to expressed interest rather
than actual participation."'157 However, all of the cases cited by the
court were decided prior to the 2005 Clarification, which specifically
recognizes interest of the students as a requisite for a finding of
noncompliance under the third prong of the 1979 Policy
Interpretation.158 In fact, the President of the College Sports Council,
151. Id. at 101 (citing Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1999)).
152. Id. (citing, for example, Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1), 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993)).
153. Id. (citing Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993))
("We recognize that in times of economic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy Title IX's
effective accommodation requirement by continuing to expand their women's athletics programs.
... Financially strapped institutions may still comply with Title IX by cutting athletic programs
such that men's and women's athletic participation rates become substantially proportionate to
their representation in the undergraduate population.").
154. Id. at 99.
155. Id. at 112.
156. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 291 F. App'x 517, 522 (4th Cir. 2008).
157. Id. at 523 (citing Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1999);
Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d
155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996)).
158. Letter from James F. Manning, supra note 79.
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Jim McCarthy, stated in response to JMU's decision to eliminate the
teams, "Last year, the [DOE] issued new guidelines - survey the
students and find out what sports they want to do. When they enroll
in the fall, answer questions about participating and the school would
take those results .... We are asking the DOE to strengthen that
guideline."159 Thus, it remains to be seen what impact, if any, a
decision on the merits of the case would have on courts' interpretation
of compliance under the 1979 Policy Interpretation.
C. The Role of the Supreme Court
The plaintiffs in Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Department of Education petitioned for certiorari in November of 2008
for review of the denial of the preliminary injunction, 160 which the
Supreme Court denied in March of 2009.161 However, it is likely that
the plaintiffs will petition for certiorari on the merits should they lose
on the merits in the Fourth Circuit. This case, or a similar case,
would be an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the
current decisions regarding compliance with Title IX, particularly in
light of the 2005 Clarification.
III. PROPORTIONALITY AS A TITLE IX VIOLATION
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a case
addressing this issue and conclude that it is impermissible under Title
IX for a university to comply under the proportionality prong of the
1979 Policy Interpretation by eliminating or capping teams when
budgetary constraints would not require such action in the absence of
a need to comply with Title IX. Title IX specifically states that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."1 62 The plain language of the statute
indicates that eliminating or capping the roster of a men's (or
women's) program when there is sufficient funding and interest to
sustain the program is impermissible when done solely on the basis of
gender balancing.
159. Nearman, supra note 146.
160. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., No. 08-672
(Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.equityinathletics.org/-docketfUS08-0000-20081118.pdf.
161. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 129 S. Ct. 1613 (2009).
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
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The Supreme Court could hold that such use of the first prong
is actually a Title IX violation. The first suggestion that schools can
comply with Title IX by eliminating programs is found in the 1996
Clarification, which states that "[a]n institution can choose to
eliminate or cap teams as a way of complying with part one of the
three-part test."163 However, the 1996 Clarification goes on to state
that Title IX is intended to provide institutions with flexibility to
comply with the statute in a nondiscriminatory manner."164 It also
emphasizes that universities are not required to eliminate or cap
teams in order to comply with Title IX.165 Thus, it seems permissible
to argue under the 1996 Clarification that eliminating programs to
comply with the 1979 Policy Interpretation is, in fact, discriminatory
under the Title IX statute when other, nondiscriminatory means of
compliance exist.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could reach the same
conclusion by holding the 1996 Clarification to be an invalid
interpretation of Title IX and the 1975 Regulations. In Christensen v.
Harris County, the Supreme Court held that opinion letters, such as
the 1996 Clarification, are not entitled to substantial deference.
1 66
Instead, the Court held that such letters are merely entitled to
"respect," but only when the underlying regulation is ambiguous. 167 In
Chalenor, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the 1979 Policy
Interpretation based on a finding that the 1975 Regulations are
ambiguous. 68 However, the provision the court quoted to support its
finding of ambiguity describes factors to be considered in determining
if a university is providing equal opportunity for participation. 169 The
regulation clearly states that "[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against
in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics.1 7 °
Contrary to the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit, this seems to be a
clear statement that a student may not be excluded from athletic
participation on the basis of gender. Thus, the Supreme Court could
find, as it did in Christenson, that the regulation is unambiguous and,
163. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Nat'l Wresting Coaches 1), 263
F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2003).
164. Letter from Norma V. Cantd, supra note 71 (emphasis added).
165. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
166. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000).
167. Id. at 587-88.
168. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2002).
169. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2007).
170. Id. § 106.41(a).
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as a result, that deference to a subsequent opinion letter is
unwarranted. 171 The Court could then easily conclude that the cutting
or capping of men's teams as a means to comply with the 1979 Policy
Interpretation and Title IX, when other, nondiscriminatory means of
compliance are available, is impermissible.
In providing guidance to schools attempting to comply under
prong three, the 2005 Clarification lends support to the theory that
choosing to eliminate or cap a men's team is actually a Title IX
violation,172 given that other, nondiscriminatory means of compliance
with almost always be available. Under the 2005 Clarification, a
university is presumed to be in compliance with prong three unless all
of the following conditions are met: "(1) unmet interest sufficient to
sustain a varsity team in the sport(s), (2) sufficient ability to sustain
an intercollegiate team in the sport, and (3) reasonable expectation of
intercollegiate competition for a team in the sport(s) within the
school's normal competitive region."'173 Thus, a school that was not in
compliance with the proportionality requirement of prong one and
could not afford to expand athletic opportunities for women under
prong two- and was not required by budgetary constraints to eliminate
programs- could still easily comply with the 1979 Policy Interpretation
under prong three. The school could either (1) disseminate surveys to
demonstrate that the interests of women in participating in athletics
are met or (2) demonstrate that it does not "have the ability" to
sustain a varsity team in a sport for which there is interest.174 Thus,
under the 2005 Clarification, it seems that a school would never be
required to eliminate teams to comply with Title IX, absent a
circumstance in which budget constraints independently required
cuts. Therefore, a decision to do so could be found to be patently
discriminatory under Title IX.
Construing Title IX to prohibit elimination of teams of an
underrepresented sex, when not otherwise required by budgetary
constraints, would not necessarily prohibit the elimination or capping
of a team in a manner that maintains proportionality when a
university can prove that it is financially required to cut or cap a team
even without the need to comply with Title IX. This accords with both
Kelley and Chalenor, where the universities presented evidence that
the elimination of a team was financially required and that a men's
171. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
172. See text accompanying note 170 (stating that the 1975 Regulations prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender).
173. Letter from James F. Manning, supra note 79.
174. See id.
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team was cut instead of a women's team in order to maintain
proportionality. 175 The reason for allowing a budget exception is that
such a situation clearly prevents a school from complying under prong
two-since it would not be possible to expand programs for the
underrepresented gender 176-and possibly also prong three, depending
on the OCR or a court's construction of "sufficient ability to sustain an
intercollegiate team" in the 2005 Clarification. 17 7  In this
circumstance, a university may be concerned about opening itself to
Title IX liability if it eliminated a women's team, creating a catch-22
of compliance. Thus, the Supreme Court should find that a university
can consider proportionality under prong one in choosing which teams
to eliminate or cap if-and only if-it can present evidence sufficient
to prove that such action is financially necessary independent of Title
IX compliance.
Such a decision by the Supreme Court would be consistent with
the plain meaning and intent of the statute and implementing
regulation. The Court could leave the 1996 Clarification in place by
finding that cutting or capping a team when other alternatives for
compliance exist is not a permissible "nondiscriminatory manner" of
complying with Title IX.178 Alternatively, the Court could find that
the 1996 Clarification is not entitled to deference and that its
acceptance of the cutting or capping of teams of the overrepresented
gender as a means of compliance with Title IX is impermissible under
the statute and implementing regulation.
Any such holding by the Supreme Court would likely generate
significant pressure on universities to end the practice of eliminating
or capping men's teams in the name of Title IX compliance. It would
also make it possible for men's teams to bring successful actions under
Title IX in response to a decision to eliminate or cap a team. As a
result, it would help eliminate the gender-based discrepancies that
Title IX was passed to combat. Thus, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari on this issue and hold that a decision by a university to cut
or cap an athletic team for the sole purpose of gender balancing, in the
absence of independent budgetary constraints, is impermissible under
Title IX.
175. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs.
(Kelley I1), 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994).
176. A Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.
177. Letter from James F. Manning, supra note 79.
178. See Letter from Norma V. CantWa, supra note 71.
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LV. CONCLUSION
Proponents of Title IX and the current framework have
recognized the negative impact of the current enforcement
mechanisms on men's sports. The former president of the NCAA,
Myles Brand, recently predicted that that cuts to men's teams will
continue as a result of Title IX. 179 In deciding how to comply with
Title IX, athletic directors have also noted these cuts as an
unfortunate consequence.180 Nonetheless, the NCAA and athletic
departments continue to make decisions to eliminate programs. Thus,
it is clear that statements by the DOE, such as the 2005 Clarification,
which provides further flexibility in Title IX compliance,181 and the
2003 Clarification, which discourages universities from complying
with Title IX through the elimination of teams,182 have been
ineffective. The Supreme Court must intervene to give effect to the
stated regulatory intention.
If the Supreme Court declines to address this issue, the DOE
itself could solve the problem of the unintended consequences of Title
IX for men's athletics by revisiting its clarifications. Indeed, the 1996
Clarification itself was a response to pressure on the DOE to revise
the Policy Interpretation, in the form of a letter written by members of
Congress encouraging the DOE to revisit the issue.18 3 Thus, it is
possible that continuing political pressure could ultimately force the
DOE to independently decide to change its position on Title IX
enforcement. The current petition to revise Title IX184 could prompt
Congress to once again appeal to the DOE to revise its interpretation
of Title IX and the implementing regulation.
In fact, the DOE has recently shown sensitivity to the impact of
its policy interpretations on men's collegiate athletics, as illustrated
by the 2003 and 2005 Clarifications. With this in mind, the climate
may be right to appeal once again to the DOE and to urge it to make a
stronger statement, perhaps even by repealing the 1996 Clarification.
This would have the same impact as adjudication by the Supreme
Court in creating substantial pressure on universities to comply with
Title IX through means other than the elimination or capping of
179. Brady, supra note 99.
180. For example, Shelley Appelbaum, senior associate athletic director at Michigan
State has stated, "I'm not naive, I know men's Olympic sports have had a tough time recently."
Rexrode, supra note 25.
181. Letter from James F. Manning, supra note 79.
182. Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 77.
183. Id. at 92.
184. Press Release, Coll. Sports Council, supra note 1.
TITLE IX AND MEN'S COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
programs. It would also make successful action by men's athletic
teams under Title IX possible. Thus, action by either the Supreme
Court or the DOE on this issue could ultimately save certain men's
collegiate sports, such as gymnastics, from a gradual, Title IX-induced
extinction.
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